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OPINION OF THE COURT  
______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Reed Dempsey brought a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Bucknell University, Bucknell 
University Public Safety (“BUPS”)1 officers, and Bucknell 
University officials (collectively, the “Bucknell Defendants”) 
claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unlawful search and seizure.  Because we agree with the 
District Court that, even taking into account certain facts 
recklessly omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, a 
reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause, we 
will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Bucknell Defendants. 
 
I. Background 
                                              
 1 Although Bucknell University is a private institution, 
BUPS officers are sworn police officers pursuant to 22 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 501.  For this reason, their official actions are 
taken “under color of state authority” for purposes of § 1983.  
Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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 A. Factual History 
 On Sunday, September 5, 2010, BUPS officer Julie 
Holtzapple received a phone call from the father of a 
nineteen-year-old Bucknell undergraduate, Kelly 
Stefanowicz, reporting that she had been assaulted by a 
fellow student, Reed Dempsey, on campus in the early hours 
of that day.  Officer Holtzapple requested that Stefanowicz 
come to the BUPS office to speak with her and other officers 
about the incident, which Stefanowicz did.  In that interview, 
Stefanowicz gave a detailed account of the incident.  She 
explained that, after a night out during which both she and 
Dempsey had consumed alcohol, the two began playfully 
“wrestling,” first in Kelly’s room, then in the hallway of their 
shared residence hall, and finally in Dempsey’s room, where 
other students were gathered.  J.A. 322.  When the other 
students left the two alone, Dempsey “picked [Stefanowicz] 
up and . . . put [her] on the futon” in his room, got on top of 
her, and put her hands over her head.  J.A. 322.  Stefanowicz 
told the officers that Dempsey “was . . . getting off to it” and 
that “he was . . . hard to it.”  J.A. 327.  She stated that they 
then struggled on the futon, and she “br[oke] free from him” 
and ran into the hall where other students were gathered.  J.A. 
322.  Stefanowicz explained that when she entered the hall, 
she was laughing because she was out of breath and “in 
shock,” but that when Dempsey caught up to her in the hall 
she “five-starred [i.e., slapped,] him right across the face” and 
told him to “leave [her] alone” in front of the other students.  
J.A.322, 324.  She reported that as she was walking away 
from him, he grabbed both of her arms, causing her to fall, 
and “tackled” her to the ground, where she struggled, 
sustaining large scrapes and bruises to her face and shoulder, 
which were visible to the officers who interviewed her.  J.A. 
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324.  She told the officers that she also had marks and bruises 
in several other places, including her “inner thigh,” “butt,” 
and “boobs,” as a result of the incident.  J.A. 324-25. 
 Stefanowicz also recounted in this interview that after 
she had returned to her room, her resident advisor (“R.A.”), a 
fellow Bucknell undergraduate, came by her room, asked her 
if she was going to file a report, and “kind of just . . . 
laughed.”  J.A. 325.  She then showed the interviewing 
officers three text messages that she had received from 
Dempsey after the incident: one at 2:43 AM that read, 
“Sorry…I’m bleeding in several places and bruises all 
over…but that was unnecessary on my part”; one at 3:35 AM 
that read, “I honestly feel horrible…I’m so sorry”; and one at 
5:11 PM that read, “Are you alright?”  J.A. 335.  Following 
the interview, Stefanowicz went to a nearby hospital for a 
medical examination in which staff noted injuries to her 
“head,” “chest,” and “right lower extremity” and took 
photographs documenting these injuries.  J.A. 851. 
 That same day, another BUPS officer contacted 
Dempsey, who agreed to meet for an interview regarding the 
incident.  Dempsey gave the interviewing officers a written 
statement he had prepared, as well as an oral interview.2  As 
reflected in the incident report, Dempsey told the officers that 
after a night out with friends, he returned to his residence hall, 
that he and Stefanowicz “started wrestling around in 
[Dempsey’s] room,” as they had done in the past, and that “it 
started to get more intense and Stefanowicz punched him in 
                                              
 2 The record on appeal contains neither a copy of this 
written statement nor a transcript of the interview.  The only 
documentation of these statements appears in a summary 
entered into the BUPS incident report. 
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the groin.”  J.A. 268.  According to Dempsey, although his 
roommate, Wade Payson-Denney, and his roommate’s friend, 
Gabriela Ors, were in the room with them “pretty much the 
whole time,” there was a period of “about a minute” during 
which he and Stefanowicz were alone in the room, and “that 
is when he got punched in the groin.”  J.A. 268.  Dempsey 
stated that Stefanowicz then got up and went into the hallway, 
and he followed her and “asked her to come back and she 
wouldn’t so he caught up to her and . . . placed his arms 
around her and gave her a bear hug,” causing the two of them 
to fall forward.  J.A. 268.  Dempsey explained that at that 
time he expressed concern “that he hurt her and that he would 
be in trouble,” and Stefanowicz told him “she was not going 
to press charges or get him in trouble.”  J.A. 268.  Dempsey 
reported, however, that “[a]fter everything started to die 
down . . . Stefanowicz would walk by him and either slap or 
punch him in the back to try and get him going again.”  J.A. 
268-69.  Dempsey stated that at that point, he “went back to 
his room and stayed there the rest of the night.”  J.A. 269. 
 Following the leads from Stefanowicz’s and 
Dempsey’s interviews, BUPS obtained written statements 
from a number of people who had witnessed parts of what 
occurred first-hand or had spoken to Stefanowicz or Dempsey 
soon after the incident.  These included, among others, fellow 
Bucknell undergraduates Morgan Slade, Demitri Carahalios, 
Wade Payson-Denney, Gabriela Ors, Kristen Brundage, 
Gregory Fast, Raina Masand, Andrew Watts, Rebecca 
Neubauer, and Stefanowicz’s R.A., Michael Sena.  BUPS 
also obtained a written statement from Stefanowicz 
recounting the incident. 
 Based on this evidence, on September 7, 2010, BUPS 
filed a criminal complaint, accompanied by an affidavit of 
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probable cause signed by Officer Holtzapple, charging 
Dempsey with simple assault, harassment, and disorderly 
conduct in violation of Pennsylvania law.  On the basis of that 
complaint and affidavit, the magistrate issued a warrant, and 
Dempsey was arraigned that same day.  The affidavit 
provided the following distillation of the results of the BUPS 
officers’ investigation into the incident3: 
On Sunday, September 5, 2010 at 
approximately 1957 hours, Officer Darrel 
Fisher, Officer Robert Ulmer and Officer Jule 
Holtzapple, all are officer’s currently with the 
Bucknell University Department of Public 
Safety/ Police Department, spoke with Kelly 
Stefanowicz. 
Kelly Stefanowicz interview is as follows: 
On Sunday, September 5, 2010, at 
approximately 0200 hours, Kelly walked home 
with two of her friends, Morgan Slade and 
Demitri Carahalios, to her room, 166 Smith 
Hall, Bucknell University, Lewisburg Pa. 
17837.  
Before entering her room, Kelly had pointed at 
Reed Dempsey. Reed then proceeded into 
Kelly’s room and hung out with Kelly, Morgan, 
and Dimitri. Kelly stated that Reed and she 
began to wrestle playfully in her room. Kelly 
                                              
 3 The affidavit is reprinted without typographical 
corrections. 
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stated she was not intimidated by Reed at this 
time and believed wrestling to be playful. 
Kelly stated that after a short time Reed had 
picked her up and carried her over his shoulder. 
Reed Dempsey carried Kelly Stefanowicz into 
his room, which is Smith 138, Bucknell 
University, Lewisburg Pa. 17837.  
Two people were in Reed’s room at this time, 
roommate Wade Payson-Denny and Gregory 
Fast. Kelly stated that Reed put her down from 
carrying her and sat her on his lap. Reed would 
not release Kelly from his lap and held her 
down, making her sit on his lap.  
Kelly stated shortly after this happened, both 
Wade Payson-Denny and Gregory Fast left 
Reed Dempsey room.  Reed’s room door shut 
automatically, after both men left the room. 
Kelly stated that at this time she no longer felt 
safe around Reed.  Kelly stated that Reed’s 
behavior had turned instantly.  It was at this 
time that Reed picked Kelly up from sitting on 
his lap and threw her onto a futon in the room.  
Reed laid on top of Kelly keeping her from 
sitting up.  Kelly stated she attempted to push 
Reed off of her.  He grabbed both of Kelly’s 
hands and held them forcefully above her head.  
Kelly stated that Reed’s penis was now erect 
under his clothes.  He was on top of her and 
pinning her to the futon.  Kelly believes that 
Reed was excited and that he was in total 
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control of her.  Kelly began to yell at Reed “to 
get off of me” and “just stop it.”  She was in 
fear of getting raped by Reed.  Kelly was able 
to release one of her hands and slapped Reed 
across the face.  Kelly and Reed then rolled off 
of the futon, falling to the floor.   
It was at this time that Kelly fell to the ground 
and landed on top of Reed.  Kelly was able to 
get off of the ground, open the closed door, and 
run out into the hallway. 
As she was walking away from Reed, and 
ignoring him, as he was calling for her to come 
back into his room.  Kelly stated that people in 
the hallway were laughing at Reed and making 
fun of him because Kelly had turned him down 
in his room.  
Reed next grabbed Kelly’s arm and began to 
pull on it.  Kelly attempted to get away from 
Reed by pulling away from him.  Reed then 
grabbed both of Kelly’s arms and held them 
behind him.  Reed then fell onto Kelly, causing 
her to fall to the floor, landing on the left side of 
her face and also her right shoulder.  Reed then 
stood up.  Kelly then proceeded to her room, 
166 Smith Hall, Bucknell University, to end this 
encounter.  
Kelly displayed text messages from Reed 
following this incident. Text messages were 
sent at 0243 hours, 0335 hours, and 0511 hours.  
Photographs were taken of messages on phone 
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from Reed.  These messages related to remorse 
for this incident and he was checking on her 
welfare. 
Kelly Stefanowicz wants to proceed with 
criminal charges in this case.  Medical treatment 
was obtained at Evangelical Community 
Hospital, 1 Hospital Drive, Lewisburg Pa. 
17837.  Photographs and medical report will be 
obtained on Wednesday, September 8, 2010. 
J.A. 452-53. 
  After Dempsey’s initial arraignment, BUPS officers 
continued to investigate the case.  In her September 5 
interview, Stefanowicz had told the officers that she was 
aware of an earlier incident between Rebecca Neubauer, 
another Bucknell undergraduate, and Dempsey, where 
Neubauer was “extremely intoxicated” and Dempsey “t[ook] 
advantage of her.”  J.A. 324.  Following up on this 
information, Officer Holtzapple interviewed Neubauer on 
September 8.  In that interview and a written statement, 
Neubauer indicated that Stefanowicz’s version of events was 
not the “full story” and that she had “nothing to speak about 
that would be relevant to Kelly’s incident.”  J.A. 275.   
 On September 9, BUPS officers conducted a second 
interview with Stefanowicz in which she discussed in greater 
detail the sexual component of the alleged assault against her.  
The following day, BUPS officers filed a second criminal 
complaint adding indecent assault and false imprisonment 
charges against Dempsey.  The affidavit of probable cause 
was substantially the same. 
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 After Dempsey’s arraignment on the additional 
charges, BUPS officers continued to gather information 
related to the allegations, including a second statement by 
Gregory Fast.  Specifically, the BUPS incident report reflects 
that following his written statement on September 5, Fast 
gave an interview on September 12 in which he stated that he 
saw Dempsey and Stefanowicz “on a futon wrestling” and 
that Stefanowicz “appeared as if she was trying to pin 
Dempsey.”  J.A. 284.  The incident report also suggests, 
based on this statement, that Fast may have entered the room 
while Dempsey and Stefanowicz were alone. 
 On October 29, 2010, the District Attorney of Union 
County, Pennsylvania, Peter Johnson, withdrew all the 
charges against Dempsey.  In a statement reported by a local 
news outlet, Johnson explained that “[t]he nature of the 
alleged crime and the surrounding circumstances make it 
difficult to prove what happened beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
J.A. 535.4 
 B. Procedural History 
 On September 6, 2011, nearly a year after the incident, 
Dempsey and his mother, Shelley Dempsey, brought suit 
against the Bucknell Defendants in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  In their 18-count complaint, the Dempseys 
                                              
 4 Prior to the withdrawal of the criminal charges, 
Stefanowicz and Dempsey initiated student conduct 
proceedings against each other pursuant to Bucknell 
University’s internal procedures.  As a result of those 
proceedings, both were found guilty of disorderly conduct. 
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asserted claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, supervisory liability, and violations of Title 
IX, as well as accompanying civil conspiracy and state law 
tort and breach of contract claims against the Bucknell 
Defendants.  The District Court dismissed nine of these 
claims and then, after discovery, granted summary judgment 
to the Bucknell Defendants on the remaining claims.5   
Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 76 F. Supp. 3d 565, 570 (M.D. 
Pa. 2015), amended in part, No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2015 WL 
999101 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015). 
 On appeal, Dempsey contends that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment on his false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and supervisory 
liability claims.  Specifically, he argues that although the 
District Court properly determined that Officer Holtzapple 
recklessly omitted information from the affidavit of probable 
cause supporting the criminal complaint against Dempsey, the 
District Court incorrectly concluded that the omitted 
                                              
 5 In the same complaint, the Dempseys also brought a 
claim of defamation against Anthony Voci, an attorney acting 
on behalf of the Stefanowiczs, based on statements he made 
to the media and to Bucknell University officials.  The 
District Court denied summary judgment on that claim, but 
determined that “[t]he claims against the Bucknell Defendants 
and Defendant Voci do not raise the same legal questions, nor 
do they depend upon proof of the same facts.”  Dempsey v. 
Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2015 WL 999101, at *2 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015).  Accordingly, the District Court 
entered a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) as 
to the claims against the Bucknell Defendants only, and thus 
those are the only claims we may consider in this appeal. 
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information was not material to the probable cause 
determination.  Because none of Dempsey’s four claims 
survives if there was probable cause for the charges against 
him, our conclusion on that question is dispositive of this 
appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Dempsey’s 
§ 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).  We will 
affirm the District Court only if we conclude “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  We must view the facts in the light most favorable to 
Dempsey, and he “is entitled to every reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin 
Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).  We do not 
weigh the evidence; rather, we determine “whether the 
evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Reedy, 615 F.3d at 210.  
Thus, in this case, summary judgment is only appropriate if 
“a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause.”  
See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 
F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
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III. Discussion 
 A. Legal Standards 
 Before turning to the facts of the case at hand, we 
address the legal standards governing our inquiry: probable 
cause and the procedure district courts are expected to use 
when reviewing a probable cause determination underlying a 
warrant. 
  1. Probable Cause 
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making 
an arrest except “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Far from demanding 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[p]robable cause 
exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed 
the crime at issue.”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 
(3d Cir. 1997)).  Put another way, “probable cause to arrest 
exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting 
officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is 
being committed by the person to be arrested.”  Orsatti v. N.J. 
State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).  The probable 
cause standard thus provides individuals protection “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, 
while simultaneously enabling investigating officers to act 
quickly—before necessarily obtaining evidence sufficient to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to effect an arrest.  
“[T]he standard does not require that officers correctly 
resolve conflicting evidence or that their determinations of 
credibility, were, in retrospect, accurate.”  Wright v. City of 
Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[i]n dealing with 
probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”  Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (alteration in original)).  For this 
reason, the Court has eschewed “any rigid demand that 
specific ‘tests’ be satisfied” and has instead prescribed a 
“totality-of-the-circumstances approach” to the probable 
cause determination.  Id. at 230-31.  That determination is 
necessarily fact-intensive, and it will usually be appropriate 
for a jury to determine whether probable cause existed.  See 
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401 (“Typically, the existence of 
probable cause in a section 1983 action is a question of fact.” 
(citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d 
Cir. 1995))).  Nevertheless, summary judgment may be 
granted on the question of probable cause if a court concludes 
that “the evidence, viewed most favorably to [the nonmoving 
party], reasonably would not support a contrary factual 
finding.”  Id.6 
                                              
 6 We are satisfied that the District Court correctly 
identified and applied this high standard in reaching its 
decision, but we note that its citation of the standard for 
qualified immunity in the same discussion gives us pause.  
The qualified immunity standard inverts the standard 
applicable here, providing instead that “there can be no 
liability on the part of the arresting officer unless ‘no 
reasonably competent officer’ would conclude that probable 
cause existed.”  Dempsey, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (quoting 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  Where, as in 
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 There is a tension inherent in evaluating probable 
cause at the summary judgment stage.  On the one hand, the 
summary judgment standard asks whether there is a “genuine 
dispute as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), viewing 
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party,” Reedy, 615 F.3d at 210.  On the other hand, the 
probable cause standard by definition allows for the existence 
of conflicting, even irreconcilable, evidence.  See, e.g., 
Wright, 409 F.3d at 603.  In his brief on appeal, Dempsey 
urges us to resolve this tension by omitting from our 
consideration of probable cause any facts unfavorable to him 
that conflict with favorable facts.  For example, as will be 
discussed further below, witness statements indicated that the 
time Dempsey and Stefanowicz were alone together was 
anywhere between one minute and ten minutes, but Dempsey 
argues that “in the light most favorable to Mr. Dempsey, the 
pair were alone for only one minute.”  Appellant’s Br. 36-37.   
 We reject Dempsey’s proposed approach.  While it is 
axiomatic that at the summary judgment stage, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it 
does not follow that we exclude from the probable cause 
analysis unfavorable facts an officer otherwise would have 
been able to consider.  Instead, we view all such facts and 
assess whether any reasonable jury could conclude that those 
facts, considered in their totality in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, did not demonstrate a “fair probability” 
                                                                                                     
this case, the defendants have not pressed qualified immunity, 
that standard should play no role in a district court’s 
determination of whether no reasonable jury could find a lack 
of probable cause such that summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant officers is appropriate. 
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that a crime occurred.  Only then would the existence of 
conflicting evidence rise to the level of a “genuine dispute as 
to any material fact” such that summary judgment would be 
inappropriate.  Thus, where the question is one of probable 
cause, the summary judgment standard must tolerate 
conflicting evidence to the extent it is permitted by the 
probable cause standard. 
  2. Reviewing a Probable Cause 
   Determination 
 
 Dempsey contends that the affidavit sworn by Officer 
Holtzapple reflected a false version of events and that an 
accurate affidavit would not establish probable cause.  To 
prevail on this claim, Dempsey must make two showings: 
first, that the officer, with at least a reckless disregard for the 
truth, “made false statements or omissions that create[d] a 
falsehood in applying for a warrant,” and second, that those 
assertions or omissions were “material, or necessary, to the 
finding of probable cause.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87 
(quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399). 
 An officer seeking a warrant on the basis of probable 
cause must follow a two-step process.  First, the officer 
swears to an affidavit containing a summary of the events that 
she believes give rise to probable cause.  In doing so, the 
officer “is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, 
even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) 
suggests that probable cause exists.”  Id. at 790 (quoting 
Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)).  Second, 
the officer presents the affidavit to a neutral magistrate, who 
conducts his own independent review of the evidence to 
determine whether it does, in fact, establish probable cause, 
and, if so, issues a warrant. 
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 In this way, our system protects the public from the 
harm caused by criminals as well as the harm that would 
result if no process were required to obtain a warrant; it 
allows officers to pursue leads zealously while also ensuring 
that an arrest warrant will issue only if “a neutral and 
detached magistrate” agrees with the officer that probable 
cause exists.  Id. at 787 (“[A]n uninterested party is 
presumably better suited to review and evaluate the facts than 
an officer pursuing a lead.”); see United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (“[T]he detached scrutiny of a 
neutral magistrate . . . is a more reliable safeguard [against 
Fourth Amendment violations] than the hurried judgment of a 
law enforcement officer . . . .”) (quoting United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).  If, however, the officer 
does not provide the neutral magistrate with an accurate 
affidavit of probable cause, the protection afforded by the 
magistrate’s review is lost; the magistrate will be unable to 
assess the circumstances for probable cause because he will 
not know what those circumstances actually are.   
 In light of the far-reaching and lasting consequences 
associated with merely being arrested,7 there is a critical need 
for faithful adherence to the process for establishing the 
existence of probable cause.  Many settings in which 
allegations of criminal conduct arise will involve 
circumstances that make credibility determinations delicate 
                                              
 7 For a recent scholarly work discussing the wide-
ranging effects of an arrest, arising both inside and outside the 
criminal justice system, see Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 
67 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 844 (2015) (noting as one example that 
“[a]rrested students whose identities are disclosed may be 
subject to lasting stigma”). 
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and difficult.  Those circumstances may include the 
involvement of alcohol, activities at unusual hours, and pre-
existing relationships between alleged victims and alleged 
perpetrators residing in the same community—or even under 
the same roof.  These considerations underscore how 
important it is, where exigencies do not require an immediate 
arrest, that officers undertake a careful investigation before 
making the serious decision to file a criminal complaint and 
that they include in the affidavit all information “‘any 
reasonable person would know that a judge would want to 
know’ in making a probable cause determination.”  Reedy, 
615 F.3d at 213 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783).  
 Nevertheless, in reviewing probable cause 
determinations made by law enforcement, the role of the 
courts is not that of the much-maligned “Monday morning 
quarterback” whose critiques are made possible only by the 
benefits of hindsight.  Rather, federal courts review the record 
to ensure that the proper procedure for determining probable 
cause was followed.  If it was not, the court itself must 
engage that procedure and determine whether probable cause 
existed in spite of that failure.  As we have described in prior 
cases, in conducting this analysis, the district court must 
identify any improperly asserted or omitted facts and, if it 
determines there were reckless misrepresentations or 
omissions, “excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the 
facts recklessly omitted” from the affidavit and assess 
whether the reconstructed affidavit would establish probable 
cause.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789.  If it would, the plaintiff’s 
claim fails because “even if there had not been omissions and 
misrepresentations” in the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate judge, there would have been probable cause for 
the charges against the plaintiff.  Id. 
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 Where there are improperly omitted or included facts, 
we have previously instructed district courts to perform 
literal, word-by-word reconstructions of challenged affidavits.  
See id. (discussing “reconstructive surgery required by our 
jurisprudence”);  Reedy, 615 F.3d at 215 (noting “[t]he 
District Court’s approach was correct” where it 
“reconstructed the Affidavit” being challenged).  This 
reconstruction requirement facilitates review of the district 
court’s determination as to the existence of probable cause.  
Recognizing, however, that our instruction has not been 
interpreted consistently as an explicit requirement, we now 
clarify that when a court determines that information was 
asserted or omitted in an affidavit of probable cause with at 
least reckless disregard for the truth, it must perform a word-
by-word reconstruction of the affidavit. 8 
 In this case, although the District Court conducted the 
required two-step analysis for reviewing the probable cause 
determination, it did not perform a word-by-word 
reconstruction of the affidavit, or at least did not include any 
                                              
 8 We recognize an exception to this requirement: There 
may be instances in which reconstruction of the entirety of an 
affidavit may be impracticable, e.g., as a result of the 
affidavit’s extraordinary length.  See, e.g., Lavin v. N.Y. 
News, Inc., 757 F.2d 1416, 1417 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
165-page affidavit detailing results of an investigation of an 
organized crime operation).  Where an affidavit is so long that 
a word-by-word reconstruction would do more to distract 
from than to clarify the court’s holding, the court should 
instead identify with particularity the evidence that should be 
deleted or inserted and specify where precisely in the affidavit 
any alterations should appear.   
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such reconstruction in its decision.  For efficiency’s sake and 
illustrative purposes, we will conduct this reconstruction 
ourselves in this case rather than remand for the District 
Court to perform it in the first instance.  
 B. Analysis 
 We turn now to the merits of Dempsey’s argument that 
the District Court erred in determining that although the 
officer recklessly omitted information from the affidavit of 
probable cause, there was nevertheless probable cause for the 
charges against Dempsey.  We follow the three-step 
procedure we described in Wilson and Reedy.  First, we assess 
the evidence the plaintiff asserts was recklessly omitted from 
the affidavit.  Next, we reconstruct an affidavit that includes 
any recklessly omitted information.  And finally, we assess 
the materiality of the omitted information to the probable 
cause determination. 
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  1. Reckless Omissions 
 To determine whether information was recklessly 
omitted, we ask whether the officer withheld “a fact in his 
ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would have known that this 
was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.’”  
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 
F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)).  In doing so, we exercise 
“scrupulous neutrality”; we do not engage the “deliberately 
slanted perspective” we must use to make the ultimate 
determination as to whether summary judgment is 
appropriate.  Reedy, 615 F.3d at 214 n.24.   
 Inherent in this inquiry are two requirements.  First, 
the officer must have knowledge of the information alleged to 
have been recklessly omitted.  For this reason, we look only 
to the information available to the officer at the time of the 
swearing of the affidavit of probable cause.  Second, the 
information must be relevant9 to the existence of probable 
                                              
 9 Although we use the term “relevant,” the 
recklessness inquiry could be understood to assess whether 
omitted information is “material,” as District Judge Louis H. 
Pollak astutely observed in dissent in Wilson.  212 F.3d at 797 
(Pollak, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . puzzling that the court 
appears to conclude both (1) that it would be unreasonable to 
keep the information from the judge, which would seem to 
suggest that it could make a difference to a probable cause 
inquiry, and (2) that it would be unreasonable to conclude that 
the information would have made a difference to probable 
cause.”).  The Wilson majority, however, concluded the 
recklessness inquiry asks only whether the omitted fact bears 
on probable cause such that it should be presented to the 
magistrate and does not answer the next question as to 
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cause.  The relevance requirement “ensures that a police 
officer does not ‘make unilateral decisions about the 
materiality of information’” by enabling a magistrate to 
decide independently, on the basis of an affidavit containing 
all relevant information, whether the circumstances give rise 
to probable cause.  Id. at 213 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 
787).  At the same time, however, it recognizes that for 
practical reasons courts simply “cannot demand that police 
                                                                                                     
whether it is material to, i.e., whether it would alter, the 
magistrate’s ultimate determination as to the existence of 
probable cause.  The Wilson approach is consistent with the 
requirement that a neutral magistrate, not an officer, make the 
ultimate probable cause determination: Even though the 
magistrate may agree with an officer that certain evidence is 
not material to probable cause, the officer must include that 
evidence if a reasonable person would know that it could 
affect the probable cause determination—a lower threshold of 
materiality.  While the concept of materiality is applicable in 
both inquiries, the benchmark for materiality is different; at 
the first step, the recklessness inquiry, we consider whether 
the officer withheld “a fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable 
person would have known that this was the kind of thing the 
judge would wish to know,’” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 
(quoting Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235), while at the second step, 
the probable cause inquiry, we consider whether any such 
omissions were “necessary[] to the finding of probable 
cause,” id. (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).  Thus, for 
ease of reference we describe the recklessness inquiry as one 
that examines the relevance of the omitted information. 
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officers relate the entire history of events leading up to a 
warrant application.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787.10   
 In his brief on appeal, Dempsey contends the 
following information was recklessly omitted from the 
affidavit of probable cause11:  
                                              
 10 Indeed, in many cases it is not only appropriate but 
desirable for officers to provide the magistrate with a distilled 
version of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause.  
Our decision in this case does not call into question the 
common practice of relating those circumstances “in 
substance and in part,” rather than in their entirety, in an 
affidavit of probable cause. 
 
 11 Dempsey’s brief on appeal provides his version of a 
reconstructed affidavit, as well as supporting discussion, from 
which we draw the information he contends was recklessly 
omitted.  As we will explain, however, we cannot wholly 
accept Dempsey’s version of the reconstructed affidavit.  One 
reason for this is that his affidavit, in some places, does not 
accurately represent the witness statements as they appear in 
the record.  For example, in two places in his brief, Dempsey 
indicates that Kristen Brundage stated she heard “laughing 
screams” from Dempsey’s room, supporting his argument 
that the evidence reflected that the events in the room were 
clearly playful, Appellant’s Br. 17, 32; in fact she stated she 
heard “laughing, screams, and crashing” from the room, J.A. 
824, lending some support for Stefanowicz’s assertion that 
the interaction went from “playful” to “scary” while the two 
were alone, J.A. 322.  In another example, Dempsey’s 
reconstructed affidavit states that “he and Kelly moved from 
his room to the hallway, when Kelly punched him in the 
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(1) statements from Morgan Slade, Demitri 
Carahalios, Wade Payson-Denney, Gabriela 
Ors, Kristen Brundage, Gregory Fast, and Raina 
Masand indicating Dempsey and Stefanowicz’s 
interactions prior to the time they were alone in 
the room together were playful and consensual 
and that they had engaged in similar activities 
before;  
(2) Gregory Fast’s statement indicating that he 
observed Dempsey and Stefanowicz during the 
time Stefanowicz alleged they were alone in the 
room and saw Stefanowicz pinning Dempsey to 
the futon, not the opposite;  
                                                                                                     
groin,” suggesting Stefanowicz punched him in the groin in 
the hallway.  Appellant’s Br. 33-34.  In his original statement 
to officers, however, Dempsey indicated that Stefanowicz 
punched him in the groin while the two were alone in the 
room and then left the room and entered the hallway.  J.A. 
268. 
 
 We will presume that any misrepresentations of record 
evidence (in both of the above-cited instances, as a result of a 
misplaced comma) were inadvertent, but we urge counsel to 
exercise the same level of care that we have urged upon the 
law enforcement officers who investigate allegations of 
criminal conduct.  Of course, we conduct our analysis based 
on the evidence reflected in the record itself. 
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(3) Dempsey’s statement to BUPS officers that 
he and Stefanowicz were alone together for 
“about a minute,” J.A. 268;  
(4) Kristen Brundage’s statement that while she 
was in the hallway and Dempsey and 
Stefanowicz were alone in Dempsey’s room, 
she heard “laughing, screams, and crashing” 
coming from the room, J.A. 824; and the fact 
that none of the witnesses who were in the hall 
heard Stefanowicz yelling at Dempsey in the 
room to “get off” her and “stop,” as 
Stefanowicz had believed they would have, J.A. 
324; 
(5) statements from Kristen Brundage and 
Gregory Fast indicating Stefanowicz was 
laughing after leaving Dempsey’s room and that 
the two were still playfully wrestling; Kristen 
Brundage’s statement that “the playfighting 
went too far” and “[e]verytime Reed would 
walk away, Kelly would chase after him, 
insulting him and egging him on,” J.A. 825; 
Gregory Fast’s statement that the two had 
agreed to stop play wrestling when “Kelly 
slapped Reed in the face” and that “Reed 
contained Kelly and brought her to the ground 
even though she struggled and was hitting him,” 
J.A. 438; and the R.A.’s statement that 
Stefanowicz was being aggressive toward 
Dempsey by, e.g., yelling profanities at him, 
and that it took physical effort to keep her away 
from Dempsey;  
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(6) Dempsey’s statement that he did not intend 
to tackle Stefanowicz; 
(7) Dempsey’s statement that he was acting in 
self-defense when he fell on Stefanowicz; 
(8) Stefanowicz’s statements to Andrew Watts, 
Raina Masand, and Kristen Brundage 
expressing remorse for her role in escalating the 
encounter and her request to her R.A. that he 
not file a report; 
(9) Dempsey’s willingness to meet with officers 
regarding the incident; 
(10) Stefanowicz’s failure to state to any 
witness prior to her first interview with BUPS 
officers that Dempsey’s “penis was erect” while 
they were on the futon, Appellant’s Br. 32; 
(11) Rebecca Neubauer’s statement that 
“[a]nything that Kelly brings up” regarding an 
alleged sexual encounter between Neubauer and 
Dempsey “is not relevant at all to 
[Stefanowicz’s] situation and incidence [sic],”  
J.A. 857. 
 The District Court concluded that the witness 
statements indicating that Stefanowicz and Dempsey were 
light-hearted and playful prior to being alone in the room and 
had engaged in similar activities before (Paragraph (1)); that 
Stefanowicz was laughing when they came back onto the hall 
(Paragraph (5)); and that she, and not Dempsey, was the 
aggressor in the hall (Paragraph (6)) were recklessly omitted 
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because they are relevant evidence of how the events reported 
in the affidavit unfolded and of Dempsey’s state of mind.  In 
addition, Dempsey urges that his statement that he and 
Stefanowicz were alone together for only “about a minute” 
(Paragraph (3)), reports from witnesses in the hall as to what 
they did and did not hear from the room when Stefanowicz 
and Dempsey were alone together (Paragraph (4)), and 
Stefanowicz’s expressions of remorse to her friends and her 
action in asking her R.A. not to file a report (Paragraph (8)) 
are pieces of information a reasonable person would know a 
magistrate would want to know given their relevance to 
Stefanowicz’s allegations of assault and the circumstances in 
which she sustained injuries.12     
After careful review, we agree that, in the context of 
this case and the allegations that were included in the 
affidavit, the information in these paragraphs was relevant to 
the probable cause determination and thus should be included 
in a reconstructed affidavit for purposes of a materiality 
analysis.  In so concluding, we emphasize that our 
determination as to the relevance of these statements is 
necessarily specific to the record before us, informed both by 
the facts of the case and the allegations set forth in the 
affidavit of probable cause, and does not indicate that there 
are categories of statements that as a rule must be included.  
Rather, we ask in the context of a given case whether “any 
reasonable person would know that a judge would want to 
                                              
 12 The Bucknell Defendants seem to agree that the time 
the two were alone is relevant.  See Appellee’s Br. 12 n.2 
(“[T]he amount of time Reed and Ms. Stefanowicz spent 
alone in Reed’s bedroom is of course relevant . . . .”).   
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know” a particular statement in making a probable cause 
determination, Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783,13 and in the context 
of this case, answer in the affirmative as to Paragraphs (1), 
(3), (4), (5), (6), and (8). 
 We are not so persuaded as to the remaining pieces of 
information cited by Dempsey.  Some of that information 
simply was not known to Officer Holtzapple, or any other 
officer, prior to either instance in which she swore the 
affidavit of probable cause.  For example, Gregory Fast’s 
statement indicating that he entered the room during the time 
Stefanowicz alleged she and Dempsey were alone together 
and saw Stefanowicz pinning Dempsey to the futon 
(Paragraph (2)) was received on September 12, after both 
affidavits of probable cause had been sworn.  J.A. 284.  In his 
September 5 statement, Fast stated only that he saw them 
“playfully wrestling on the futon” but then left the room and 
did not see them emerge for “10-minutes give-or-take.”  J.A. 
438.  Likewise, while Dempsey told police on September 5 
                                              
 13 Moreover, and as is clear from our discussion in 
footnote 9, supra, at this point in our analysis we do not 
assess whether the recklessly omitted information was in fact 
material to probable cause when considered in combination 
with the other evidence reflected in the affidavit.  Nor does a 
determination that information was recklessly omitted 
necessarily mean that an officer acted in bad faith.  To the 
contrary, as officers engage “in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime,” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)), 
and draw on their own experience and expertise to assess 
witnesses and evidence in an investigation, they may at times 
omit information recklessly but in good faith.   
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that he did not intend to injure Stefanowicz, the record on 
appeal reflects that he did not claim he was acting in self-
defense (Paragraph (7)) until his deposition in 2013, at which 
time he stated that she “hit [him] in the genitals” while the 
two were in the hall and “[t]o avoid her doing so again, [he] 
reached [his] arms around her as she kind of turned around,” 
resulting in both falling to the ground.  J.A. 798-99.  Thus, we 
will not include either of these statements in the reconstructed 
affidavit. 
 Some of this information was not recklessly omitted 
because it is not information “‘any reasonable person would 
know that a judge would want to know’ in making a probable 
cause determination.”  Reedy, 615 F.3d at 213 (quoting 
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783).  For instance, Dempsey’s 
cooperation with law enforcement (Paragraph (9)) is not 
relevant because cooperation may merely reflect a person’s 
erroneous belief that he has not committed a crime, see Heien 
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (discussing the 
“well-known maxim, ‘[i]gnorance of the law is no 
excuse[]’”), or may stem from savvy or hubris rather than a 
“clean conscience,” United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 
973 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding “cooperation did not negate 
the risk,” established by other evidence, that suspect was 
armed). 
 In addition, the fact that Stefanowicz does not appear 
to have told anyone prior to her first interview with police 
that Dempsey’s “penis was erect,” Appellant’s Br. 32, while 
he pinned her to the futon (Paragraph (10)) was not recklessly 
omitted because it has limited significance in view of 
statements Stefanowicz did make, according to two witnesses.  
Although it is true that the record does not reflect that 
Stefanowicz used those precise words prior to her interview 
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with police, it does reflect that she told Raina Masand 
immediately after the incident that “Reed pushed her onto the 
ground and tried to take advantage of her.”  J.A. 435.  Kristen 
Brundage also reported that Stefanowicz told her immediately 
after the incident that “Reed had tried to ‘take advantage of 
her.’”  J.A. 825.  These statements are sufficient to 
demonstrate that Stefanowicz’s first report of the incident 
described the assault as having a sexual dimension.  We 
therefore will not include this information in the 
reconstructed affidavit.   
 Similarly, Rebecca Neubauer’s statement (Paragraph 
(11)) was not recklessly omitted because it has no relevance 
to the probable cause determination.  Rather than 
contradicting Stefanowicz’s statement that something had 
occurred between Dempsey and Neubauer, Neubauer’s 
statement appears to confirm there had been some interaction 
and to add only that, according to Neubauer, Stefanowicz did 
not know the whole story and Neubauer considered it “not 
relevant at all.”  J.A. 857.  Because it is not relevant, this 
statement also will not be included in the reconstructed 
affidavit.  
 2. Reconstructed Affidavit for  
  Materiality Analysis 
 
 In the normal course, the next step of our analysis 
would be to reconstruct the affidavit, including the recklessly 
omitted information, so that we may proceed with a 
materiality analysis.  In some cases, however, there will be 
other information in the record that gives context to or affects 
the weight to be accorded the recklessly omitted information, 
such that it also should be considered by the reviewing court 
in determining materiality.   
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 We faced such a situation in United States v. Frost, 
where we evaluated an affidavit of probable cause underlying 
a search warrant for a suitcase.  999 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993).  
The criminal defendant there alleged that the affidavit 
recklessly omitted the fact that a drug-sniffing dog had not 
gone into alert upon sniffing the suitcase.  Id. at 743.  The 
officer who swore the affidavit testified, however, that he 
believed the dog’s failure to alert was a “neutral factor” in the 
probable cause analysis because drug couriers often use 
“scent masking” techniques to avoid detection.  Id.  Without 
deciding whether the omission of that information was 
reckless, we concluded that “the relevant issue [was] whether 
the . . . affidavit would have provided probable cause if it had 
disclosed the information concerning the dog’s sniffing of the 
suitcase, including the information about ‘scent masking’ that 
[the officer] knew and would have included to enable the 
magistrate to evaluate the dog’s failure to alert.  Only an 
evaluation of the affidavit so supplemented will reveal 
whether there is a causal connection between [the officer’s] 
failure to disclose and [probable cause].”  Id. at 743.  Frost 
teaches that where additional information in the record bears 
on the materiality of the recklessly omitted information to 
probable cause, that additional information also should be 
included the reconstructed affidavit. 
 Such is the case here.  For example, with regard to the 
witness statements indicating that the two were playful before 
and after being alone together and that Stefanowicz was the 
aggressor in the hall (Paragraphs (5) and (6)), it is also 
relevant to the probable cause determination that Stefanowicz 
herself told officers she was laughing when she reentered the 
hall from Dempsey’s room and that it was because she “was 
in shock,”  J.A. 322, and that while Gregory Fast reported that 
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Dempsey fell on Stefanowicz while trying to “contain her,” 
i.e., to keep her from hitting him again, Dempsey had 
reported to officers that “he asked her to come back” when 
she left the room and when she wouldn’t, “he caught up to her 
and . . . placed his arms around her and gave her a bear hug,” 
causing the two to fall forward, J.A. 268.  With regard to the 
statements pertaining to the time the two were alone 
(Paragraphs (3) and (4)), it is also relevant that Gregory Fast 
stated that he believed it was about ten minutes between when 
he left the room and when the two exited.  Because this 
information bears on the weight a magistrate would accord 
the recklessly omitted statements in making the ultimate 
determination as to probable cause, we will also include this 
information in the reconstructed affidavit.   
 An affidavit reconstructed to include both the 
recklessly omitted information and the other information that 
gives it context would read as follows: 
On Sunday, September 5, 2010 at 
approximately 1957 hours, Officer Darrel 
Fisher, Officer Robert Ulmer and Officer Jule 
Holtzapple, all are officer’s currently with the 
Bucknell University Department of Public 
Safety/ Police Department, spoke with Kelly 
Stefanowicz. 
[The investigation revealed evidence] as 
follows: 
On Sunday, September 5, 2010, at 
approximately 0200 hours, Kelly walked home 
with two of her friends, Morgan Slade and 
Demitri Carahalios, to her room, 166 Smith 
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Hall, Bucknell University, Lewisburg Pa. 
17837.  
Before entering her room, Kelly had pointed at 
Reed Dempsey. Reed then proceeded into 
Kelly’s room and hung out with Kelly, Morgan, 
and Dimitri. Kelly stated that Reed and she 
began to wrestle playfully in her room. Kelly 
stated she was not intimidated by Reed at this 
time and believed wrestling to be playful.  
[Witnesses stated that they had play wrestled 
before.] 
Kelly stated that after a short time Reed had 
picked her up and carried her over his shoulder. 
Reed Dempsey carried Kelly Stefanowicz into 
his room, which is Smith 138, Bucknell 
University, Lewisburg Pa. 17837.  [Witness 
Kristen Brundage stated that she saw Reed 
carrying Kelly, who was laughing and hitting 
him on the butt with a shoe.] 
Two people were in Reed’s room at this time, 
roommate Wade Payson-Denny and Gregory 
Fast. Kelly stated that Reed put her down from 
carrying her and sat her on his lap. Reed would 
not release Kelly from his lap and held her 
down, making her sit on his lap.  [Witness 
Gabriela Ors recounted being in Reed’s 
room for about ten minutes, and that the 
situation never seemed violent. Witness 
Wade Payson-Denney said that he saw Kelly 
and Reed in the room jokingly wrestling on 
the floor.] 
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Kelly stated shortly after this happened, both 
Wade Payson-Denny and Gregory Fast left 
Reed Dempsey room.  Reed’s room door shut 
automatically, after both men left the room. 
Kelly stated that at this time she no longer felt 
safe around Reed.  Kelly stated that Reed’s 
behavior had turned instantly.  It was at this 
time that Reed picked Kelly up from sitting on 
his lap and threw her onto a futon in the room.  
Reed laid on top of Kelly keeping her from 
sitting up.  Kelly stated she attempted to push 
Reed off of her.  He grabbed both of Kelly’s 
hands and held them forcefully above her head.  
Kelly stated that Reed’s penis was now erect 
under his clothes.  He was on top of her and 
pinning her to the futon.  Kelly believes that 
Reed was excited and that he was in total 
control of her.  Kelly began to yell at Reed “to 
get off of me” and “just stop it.”  She was in 
fear of getting raped by Reed.  Kelly was able 
to release one of her hands and slapped Reed 
across the face.  Kelly and Reed then rolled off 
of the futon, falling to the floor.  [Although 
Kelly stated she believed people must have 
heard her, no witnesses reported hearing 
these exact words.  Witness Kristin 
Brundage stated, however, that when Kelly 
and Reed were alone in the room she heard 
“laughing, screams, and crashing.”  Reed 
stated he believed they were alone in the 
room for about a minute, while Gregory 
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Fast’s statement indicates they were alone 
for about ten minutes.] 
It was at this time that Kelly fell to the ground 
and landed on top of Reed.  Kelly was able to 
get off of the ground, open the closed door, and 
run out into the hallway.  [Although Reed’s 
story corroborated Kelly’s that she left the 
room before him, other witnesses in the hall 
indicated that the two “came out wrestling.  
It seemed like play wrestling, with laughing 
and goofy insults.”  Kelly stated that she was 
laughing when she came onto the hall 
because she “was in shock.”] 
As she was walking away from Reed, and 
ignoring him, as he was calling for her to come 
back into his room.  Kelly stated that people in 
the hallway were laughing at Reed and making 
fun of him because Kelly had turned him down 
in his room. 
Reed next grabbed Kelly’s arm and began to 
pull on it.  Kelly attempted to get away from 
Reed by pulling away from him.  Reed then 
grabbed both of Kelly’s arms and held them 
behind him.  Reed then fell onto Kelly, causing 
her to fall to the floor, landing on the left side of 
her face and also her right shoulder.  Reed then 
stood up.  [Witness Gregory Fast reported 
that after a mutual agreement to stop play 
wrestling Kelly slapped Reed in the face, and 
only then did Reed fall on Kelly in an 
attempt to contain her.  Reed, however, did 
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not report that she slapped him and he was 
trying to contain her when he fell on her, 
stating instead that he asked her to come 
back after she left his room and placed his 
arms around her and gave her a bear hug, 
accidentally falling on her.]  Kelly then 
proceeded to her room, 166 Smith Hall, 
Bucknell University, to end this encounter.  
[Witness Kristen Brundage stated, however, 
that “every time Reed would walk away, 
Kelly would chase after him, insulting him 
and egging him on.”  R.A. Michael Sena 
reported that when he came onto the hall, 
after the fall, Kelly was yelling profanities at 
Reed and it took some effort on the R.A.’s 
part to contain her.  He also reported that 
Kelly told him that she and Reed were just 
playing around and asked him not to file a 
report that night.] 
Kelly displayed text messages from Reed 
following this incident. Text messages were 
sent at 0243 hours, 0335 hours, and 0511 hours.  
Photographs were taken of messages on phone 
from Reed.  These messages related to remorse 
for this incident and he was checking on her 
welfare.  [Kelly also expressed remorse for 
her role in escalating the encounter to 
Witnesses Andrew Watts, Raina Masand, 
and Kristen Brundage.]  
Kelly Stefanowicz wants to proceed with 
criminal charges in this case.  Medical treatment 
was obtained at Evangelical Community 
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Hospital, 1 Hospital Drive, Lewisburg Pa. 
17837.  Photographs and medical report will be 
obtained on Wednesday, September 8, 2010. 
  3. Materiality 
 We turn now to the question whether the recklessly 
omitted statements, considered in the context of the affidavit 
as a whole, were omissions “material, or necessary, to the 
finding of probable cause.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (quoting 
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).  To affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment, we must conclude that “no 
reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the 
conclusion” that the reconstructed affidavit “lacked probable 
cause.”  Id. at 792. 
 Dempsey was charged with simple assault, 
harassment, disorderly conduct, indecent assault, and false 
imprisonment.  Because probable cause exists where there is 
merely a “fair probability” that the arrestee committed a 
crime, we need not identify “the same type of specific 
evidence of each element of [an] offense as would be needed 
to support a conviction.”  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
149 (1972).  In light of the fact that Dempsey has pressed his 
malicious prosecution claim on appeal, however, we will 
assess whether any reasonable jury could find a lack of 
probable cause as to any of the five crimes charged against 
him, bearing in mind that although false arrest or 
imprisonment claims will necessarily fail if probable cause 
existed for any one of the crimes charged against the arrestee, 
“probable cause on one charge does not foreclose a malicious 
prosecution cause of action” based on additional charges for 
which there was no probable cause.  Johnson v. Knorr, 477 
F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  In the case of 
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prosecution, unlike arrest, unfounded charges “almost surely 
will place an additional burden on the defendant,” and thus 
we must consider probable cause as to each of the charges.  
Id. at 84.   
 In assessing whether the reconstructed affidavit 
establishes probable cause, we also must bear in mind our 
Circuit’s rule that statements of a victim witness are typically 
sufficient to establish probable cause in the absence of 
“[i]ndependent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence 
of [a] witness’s own unreliability” that “outweigh[s]” the 
probable cause that otherwise exists.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 
790; Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“When a police officer has received a reliable identification 
by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable 
cause to arrest.”).  Applying this principle, we have held that 
no reasonable jury could find a lack of probable cause where 
a victim identified the arrestee in a photo array, but other 
evidence suggested the perpetrator was significantly taller 
than the arrestee, a different victim did not identify the 
arrestee, and another witness claimed to have seen the 
arrestee at the time of the crime, Wilson, 212 F.3d at 791-92, 
and where a victim first identified a different person as her 
assailant before changing her story to identify the arrestee, 
Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 818-19.  Thus, some “unreliability or 
exculpatory evidence” will not “fatally undermine[]” 
probable cause otherwise established.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 
790.14 
                                              
 14 Dempsey cites a Sixth Circuit case, Wesley v. 
Campbell, which declared that “[i]t is well-settled that 
evidence contradicting even part of a witness’s allegations 
seriously undermines their reliability and can defeat probable 
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 With these principles in mind, we turn to the 
reconstructed affidavit. 
   a. Evidence Supporting Probable  
    Cause 
 
 We first address Dempsey’s threshold argument that 
the evidence cited by the District Court—Stefanowicz’s 
multiple statements and Raina Masand’s statement 
corroborating in large part her version of events; the 
photographs of Stefanowicz’s injuries, taken immediately 
following the incident and the next day during the medical 
examination; and the text messages sent by Dempsey to 
Stefanowicz in the hours following the incident—does not 
give rise to probable cause that he committed the crimes of 
simple assault, harassment, disorderly conduct, indecent 
assault, and false imprisonment. 
 First, Dempsey argues that Stefanowicz’s multiple 
statements, as well as Raina Masand’s corroborating 
statement, are “prior inconsistent statements” and that a jury 
should have been allowed to decide whether Stefanowicz 
“merely added detail or, in fact, changed her story.”  
                                                                                                     
cause.”  779 F.3d 421, 435 (6th Cir. 2015).  As should be 
clear from our discussion of Sharrar v. Felsing and Wilson v. 
Russo, this statement from the Sixth Circuit does not reflect 
the law of our Circuit.  Furthermore, Wesley involved a set of 
facts in which there was no physical evidence of alleged 
repeated abuse and there were myriad reasons to believe that 
the victim witness was thoroughly unreliable; it is far from 
clear that Wesley would dictate the result Dempsey advocates 
on the facts presented in this case. 
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Appellant’s Br. 40.  We disagree.  The fact that Stefanowicz 
gave multiple accounts of the incident is, without more, not 
exculpatory; she did so at the request of law enforcement 
officers, suggesting that Stefanowicz was simply acting as a 
cooperative witness, not that she was seeking opportunities to 
change her story to implicate Dempsey in more serious 
offenses.  Furthermore, Dempsey has pointed us to no 
specific inconsistencies in Stefanowicz’s statements to law 
enforcement and her friends, other than those we have already 
addressed and concluded were not inconsistencies at all.  See 
supra Part III.B.1 (addressing Dempsey’s argument that 
Stefanowicz did not describe the incident as having a sexual 
dimension until she related her version of events to BUPS 
officers). 
Second, Dempsey asserts that the photographs “proved 
only that Ms. Stefanowicz was injured in some way” and, in 
any event, “do not depict injuries consistent with the vicious 
attack Kelly alleged.”  Appellant’s Br. 41.  We again 
disagree.  Stefanowicz described an assault in which 
Dempsey aggressively touched her, including pinching and 
punching, first during play wrestling and then against her 
wishes while the two were alone and, in the hallway, 
“tackled” her, leading to injuries to her face and shoulder.  
J.A. 324.  The photographs taken during the medical 
examination revealed injuries to Stefanowicz’s “chest” and 
“right lower extremity.”  J.A. 851; S.A. 42-47.  Furthermore, 
the record clearly reflects that the injuries to her face and 
shoulder were sustained as a result of her falling in the 
hallway: Pictures documenting those injuries were taken 
immediately after the incident, S.A. 1-6, and Raina Masand, 
Kristen Brundage, and R.A. Michael Sena all reported 
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observing injuries to Stefanowicz’s face at that time.  This 
evidence is consistent with Stefanowicz’s allegations. 
Finally, Dempsey contends that while his text 
messages to Stefanowicz “could demonstrate remorse, they 
just as logically show an attempt to diffuse a heated situation 
between friends.”  Appellant’s Br. 42.  Even assuming we 
agree with Dempsey that his text messages could be 
understood that way, they nevertheless demonstrate that at the 
very least, he was a party to what he viewed as a “heated 
situation.”   
Mindful that the question we must ask at this stage is 
whether “a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable 
cause,” Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 124, i.e., that the evidence 
gives rise to a “fair probability” that Dempsey committed the 
crimes alleged, Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789 (quoting Sherwood, 
113 F.3d at 401), we conclude that Stefanowicz’s and 
Masand’s statements, the documented injuries, and the text 
messages establish probable cause, and that no reasonable 
jury could come to a contrary conclusion. 
   b. Evidence Undermining  
    Probable Cause 
 
Having determined that inculpatory evidence, reflected 
in the reconstructed affidavit, gives rise to probable cause for 
each of the five crimes charged against Dempsey, the 
question remaining is whether there is “[i]ndependent 
exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of 
[Stefanowicz’s] own unreliability” that “outweigh[s]” the 
probable cause otherwise established by the affidavit of 
probable cause.  Id. at 790.  The reconstructed affidavit 
reflects two categories of recklessly omitted information that, 
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Dempsey submits undermines probable cause: witness 
statements contradicting Stefanowicz’s version of events and 
evidence of the amount of time the two were alone together.  
In light of the evidence corroborating in substantial part 
Stefanowicz’s story and the existence of a period of time in 
which no one disputes the two were alone together in 
Dempsey’s room, we conclude that even considering the 
recklessly omitted information, no reasonable jury could 
determine that the affidavit lacked probable cause. 
    i. Witness Statements 
 Dempsey contends that omitted witness statements 
indicating that the interaction between Stefanowicz and 
Dempsey was playful and, when it was not playful, 
Stefanowicz was the aggressor, are material to the probable 
cause determination because they “contradicted Ms. 
Stefanowicz’s story in striking ways.”  Appellant’s Br. 38.   
 First, he argues that while Stefanowicz says she yelled 
at Dempsey while they were alone in his room, “not one of 
the witnesses in the hall heard Ms. Stefanowicz yell stop, but 
instead reported hearing playful noises.”  Id.  But this 
contention is not supported by the record evidence.  In fact, 
Kristen Brundage stated that she heard “laughing, screams, 
and crashing” coming from the room.  J.A. 824 (emphasis 
added).  Far from contradicting Stefanowicz’s story, it is 
largely consistent, not inconsistent, with her assertion that she 
struggled against Dempsey, as well as with her statements 
indicating that her interaction with Dempsey “immediately 
transitioned from ‘funny’ and ‘joking’ to ‘scary’ and ‘dark’” 
when the two were left alone in Dempsey’s room.  J.A. 445.   
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 Second, Dempsey avers that “the eye witnesses almost 
unanimously agreed that Ms. Stefanowicz and not Mr. 
Dempsey was the aggressor.”  Appellant’s Br. 39.  This 
statement is true as to what witnesses observed in the hallway 
after the two had emerged from the room, but it does not 
explain what happened while the two were in the room.  
Furthermore, Stefanowicz herself told officers that she 
slapped Dempsey “right across the face” while the two were 
in the hallway; in that sense, her story—that when they left 
the room, she was aggressive toward Dempsey—is consistent 
with that of the witnesses in the hall.  J.A. 324.  Bearing in 
mind that probable cause “does not require that officers 
correctly resolve conflicting evidence or that their 
determinations of credibility, were, in retrospect, accurate,” 
Wright, 409 F.3d at 603, we conclude that the existence of 
some conflict between Stefanowicz’s story and that of the 
eyewitnesses in the hallway does not undermine the existence 
of probable cause. 
 Our conclusion is necessarily specific to the 
circumstances presented in this case.  Were the events in the 
hallway the only basis for the assault charges against 
Dempsey, the evidence reflecting that Stefanowicz was the 
aggressor during that portion of the incident might have been 
material to a probable cause determination.  But in light of the 
undisputed fact that the two were alone in Dempsey’s room 
for some period of time; the lack of any evidence 
contradicting Stefanowicz’s explanation of the events that 
occurred in the room, aside from Dempsey’s explanation, i.e., 
that their playful wrestling “started to get more intense and 
Stefanowicz punched him in the groin,”  J.A. 268; and the 
existence of evidence corroborating her version of events in 
substantial part, no reasonable jury could conclude there was 
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not a “fair probability” that a crime occurred, notwithstanding 
the conflicting evidence as to Dempsey’s intent and actions in 
the hallway. 
    ii. Time Alone 
 Dempsey also challenges the significance of the time 
he and Stefanowicz were alone together, asserting that the 
fact that he told BUPS that they were only alone in the room 
together for one minute materially undermines Stefanowicz’s 
story about what happened during that time.  In addition, he 
asks us to consider as part of our analysis Gregory Fast’s 
September 12 statement, in which Fast indicated that he 
observed Stefanowicz and Dempsey during the time she said 
Dempsey was on top of her on the futon, while the two were 
alone, as part of our materiality analysis.  As we explained in 
Part III.B.1, supra, however, that statement was received after 
both instances in which the affidavit of probable cause was 
sworn, and therefore we cannot consider it.  We emphasize 
that in making the determination about the existence of 
probable cause, we examine only the information available to 
the officer at the time of the swearing of the affidavit of 
probable cause.  After-acquired evidence, however significant 
for trial, does not inform an officer’s knowledge or good faith 
as is relevant for our inquiry today.   
 As we have explained, we will consider not only 
Dempsey’s statement, but, as the District Court did, all of the 
information on that topic received by the officers.  As the 
reconstructed affidavit reflects, the officers had information 
indicating that the two were alone in the room together for 
somewhere between one minute and ten minutes.  In addition, 
the officers knew that while the accused person had stated the 
two were only alone together for about one minute, a third-
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party witness, Gregory Fast, had indicated in his September 5 
statement that the time was around ten minutes.  Furthermore, 
estimates of time may not always be particularly reliable.  
See, e.g., Martin v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 23 F.2d 324, 325 (5th 
Cir. 1928) (“Estimates of time and distance of bystanders 
witnessing an accident are notoriously inaccurate, and entitled 
to little weight at best.”).  In any event, it is not implausible 
that the events in the room that Stefanowicz described took 
place in the course of “about a minute.”  Viewing this 
evidence, along with all the other evidence of record, in the 
light most favorable to Dempsey, it is not material to the 
determination that there was a “fair probability” that a crime 
occurred.    
IV. Conclusion 
 Because we conclude that no reasonable jury could 
find that the reconstructed affidavit lacked probable cause, we 
will affirm the order of the District Court. 
